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Abstract
We propose a model that examines the optimal size of venture capital and
private equity fund portfolios. The relationship between a VC and entrepre-
neurs is characterized by double-sided moral hazard, which causes the VC to
trade off larger portfolios against lower values of portfolio companies. We ana-
lyze the structural relations between the VC’s optimal portfolio structure and
entrepreneurs’ and VC’s productivities, their disutilities of effort, the value of
a successful project, and the required initial investment in a venture. We also
test the model’s predictions using a small proprietary dataset collected through
a survey targeted to VC and private equity funds worldwide.
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1 Introduction
Venture capital provides an opportunity for young, innovative firms to develop and
grow. Unlike regular investors, venture capitalists (VCs) are actively involved in the
management of their portfolio companies. VCs provide assistance with strategic and
operational planning, management recruitment, marketing, and obtaining additional
capital.1 However, the relationship between VCs and entrepreneurs is characterized
by double-sided moral hazard. In most cases, the parties’ effort levels are unobserv-
able/nonverifiable and, thus, noncontractible.
Unlike the optimal contracting between VCs and entrepreneurs,2 the optimal size
of VCs’ portfolios has received little attention in the theoretical and empirical venture
capital literature. Investing in multiple ventures, as opposed to a single project, allows
a VC to make the best use of her funds, while reducing the risk of her investment.
However, because the VC invests time and effort in advising her portfolio firms,
increasing the number of firms in the portfolio dilutes the quantity and quality of
managerial advice to each entrepreneurial venture.
Because the number of experts is limited, venture capital is not easily scalable.
The higher the number of ventures financed and advised by a VC, the lower the
amount of advice provided to each venture.3 If entrepreneurs’ and VC’s efforts are
complementary, reduced VC’s advice can also lead to a lower commitment of en-
trepreneurs to their ventures. On the other hand, if VC’s wealth is unconstrained,
investing in more ventures increases the expected total dollar return of her portfolio.
Thus, the choice of the optimal portfolio size involves a trade-off between the number
1See Sahlman (1990) for a discussion of the nature of the relationship between VCs and entrepre-
neurs, and Gorman and Sahlman (1989) and Wright and Lockett (2003) for some survey evidence
of VCs’ activities.
2There is a large literature concerned with the design of financial contracts that mitigate the
agency problems between VCs and entrepreneurs. See Bascha and Walz (2001), Bergemann and
Hege (1998), Cornelli and Yosha (2003), Garmaise (2001), Houben (2002), Kaplan and Strömberg
(2004), Marx (1998), Repullo and Suarez (2004), and Schmidt (2003), among others, for models of
optimal structure of contracts between VCs and enterpreneurs. See Gompers (1995) and Gompers
and Lerner (1999b) for empirical investigations of venture capital contracts.
3In addition, Cestone and White (2003) show that it may be beneficial for a VC to commit to
not fund too many ventures because potential competition among ventures in the VC’s portfolio
may diminish expected returns.
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of projects and each project’s expected value net of the cost of VC’s effort devoted
to it.
Our paper builds on a few recent important papers in the VC literature. Kanni-
ainen and Keuschnigg (2003, 2004), KK henceforth, provide seminal theoretical analy-
sis of the optimal size of VCs’ portfolios. (In what follows, we use the terms “portfolio
size” and “number of portfolio firms” interchangeably.) Fulghieri and Sevilir’s (2004)
model considers a VC’s incentives to concentrate on a single venture versus investing
in two ventures. Cumming (2006) provides an empirical analysis of VCs’ portfolio
sizes using a Canadian dataset. Kaplan and Strömberg (2003) and Hege, Palomino,
and Schwienbacher (2003) provide some evidence on the allocation of cash flows be-
tween VCs and entrepreneurs.
Our paper contributes to the literature in two ways. First, we extend the theo-
retical literature by simultaneously examining VC’s portfolio size and the allocation
of cash flow rights between a VC and entrepreneurs. We show that endogenizing the
profit sharing between the parties is instrumental in analyzing the determinants of
the optimal VC’s portfolio structure. Second, we test the predictions of our model
using a unique international VC and private equity dataset.
The essential elements of our model are as follows. A VC chooses not only the
number of firms in her portfolio, but also the shares of the ventures’ profits that
the entrepreneurs retain. Profit sharing affects the optimal effort levels exerted by
the VC and the entrepreneurs, which, in turn, determine the expected values of
entrepreneurial ventures.
The complexity of the model allows us to derive only the equilibrium effort levels
of the VC and the entrepreneurs in a general form. We make two compromises
while solving for the optimal portfolio structure. First, we assume specific functional
forms for the probability of a venture’s success, as well as for the costs of VC’s and
entrepreneurs’ efforts. Second, we assume that VC’s and entrepreneurs’ efforts are
additive and, thus, not complementary to the probability of projects’ success.4 The
model results in unambiguous predictions regarding the effect of the parameters on
the optimal portfolio size only when the sharing rule is held constant. However,
when we endogenize the sharing rule, the signs of the reduced-form relations between
4This assumption is made for analytical tractability only and it does not affect the relation
between the optimal portfolio structure and the model’s parameters.
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most of the parameters and the optimal portfolio size become ambiguous. Thus, we
demonstrate that one should account for the endogeneity of both the profit sharing
rule and the portfolio size while examining these relations empirically.
The framework of our model of effort choices is most similar to Bhattacharyya
and Lafontaine (1995), who analyze franchising agreements, which also pose a double-
sided moral hazard problem for a principal facing multiple agents.5 The framework of
our model in the portfolio structure choice stage is more similar to that in Casamatta
(2003), who examines the rationale for the joint provision of funds and advice by VCs
to entrepreneurs.
To test the predictions of the model we obtained comprehensive data for 42 gen-
eralist venture capital and private equity funds based in Europe and North America
through a survey and follow-up phone interviews in 2004.6 We analyze the deter-
minants of VCs’ portfolio sizes and entrepreneurs’ profit shares while accounting for
the inherent endogeneity of the profit sharing rule using instrumental variables. The
results of the analysis provide some support for the predictions of our model. In
particular, we find strong support for the prediction that VC’s portfolio size varies
non-monotonically with the profit shares held by entrepreneurs. In addition, consis-
tent with the model, entrepreneurs’ profit shares are found to be positively related
to the number of firms in VC’s portfolio. Overall, while the data do not support
every specific detail of the model, the evidence is consistent with the notion that
VC’s portfolio size and profit sharing rule are determined jointly.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section lays out
the framework of the model. We derive the relations between the optimal VC’s and
entrepreneurs’ effort levels and the model’s parameters in a general setting in Section
3. Section 4 analyzes the optimal VC’s portfolio structure. In Section 5 we establish
empirical implications for the system of relations among the portfolio size, the profit
shares given to entrepreneurs, and the model’s parameters, and present the data and
5The difference between our model and that of Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine (1995) is that in
their setting, the assumption of a constant marginal cost of effort of a franchizor (the party choosing
the number of “companies" in her portfolio of franchisees) makes the optimal choice of the number
of portfolio firms irrelevant. Double-sided moral hazard in the venture capital setting has been
analyzed, most recently, by Casamatta (2003), Casamatta and Haritchabalet (2004), Cassiman and
Ueda (2006), Lerner and Schoar (2005), Schmidt (2003), and Ueda (2004).
6Generalist funds are those investing in a wide array of firms, both in early and late stages.
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the empirical tests of the model’s predictions. We conclude and discuss the limitations
of this study and possible directions for future research in Section 6. All proofs are
provided in the Appendix.
2 The setup of the model
Consider a single venture capitalist, who finances multiple risky entrepreneurial ven-
tures. There is an infinitely elastic supply of identical projects, each requiring an
initial investment of I and providing a (discounted) cash flow of R if successful, and
zero if unsuccessful. Assuming that the value of a project in an unfavorable state is
zero simplifies the analysis, but prevents us from analyzing security design issues —
for example, the expected payoff from holding a fraction x of a firm’s equity is iden-
tical to a debt position with a promised repayment of xR. However, optimal security
design is not the focus of this paper.7 This setting assumes one financing round.8
Entrepreneurs are assumed to be identical. This assumption may seem unrealistic,
since VCs’ screening ability is limited, and they typically have both “good” and
“bad” projects in their portfolios. However, the distinction between “good” and
“bad” projects is made ex-post, while the portfolio structure decisions are based on
entrepreneurial ventures’ ex-ante characteristics. In addition, this assumption reflects
the largely documented specialization of the majority of VCs, who tend to invest in
similar projects.9
The probability of venture i’s success, pi, depends on the effort exerted by en-
trepreneur i, ei, the effort (the amount of advice to venture i) exerted by the VC,
7Security design is the focus of recent papers by Casamatta (2003) and Cestone and White (2003)
among others. They assume that the project value can take two realizations: Rhigh and Rlow, and
are able to examine the effects of the form of financing on entrepreneurs’ and VCs’ actions.
8The no-staging assumption precludes dynamic considerations. With multiple rounds of financ-
ing, the optimal structure of VC’s portfolio would be affected by her past decisions, as well as by
past shocks to projects’ values. While staging is an important phenomenon, it is beyond the scope
of our analysis. See Fulghieri and Sevilir (2004) for a model in which a VC can re-allocate resources
from a failing venture to a successfull one in the second financing stage.
9Moreover, the results of our model for the case of identical entrepreneurs can be easily extended
to a case in which a VC faces entrepreneurs with different characteristics, as long as there is no
information asymmetry. This extension is available upon request.
4
Ei, the productivity (quality) of the entrepreneurs, α, and that of the VC, β. The
modelling of an entrepreneur’s effort level as a continuous variable is one of the dif-
ferences between our approach and that of KK, where entrepreneurs’ effort choices
are binary, and the profit shares given to the entrepreneurs are the lowest ones that
satisfy their participation constraint. Because VC’s and entrepreneurs’ effort levels
only affect the probabilities of projects’ success, and are not verifiable, they are not
contractible.
We assume that all agents in the model are risk-neutral. This assumption has the
following implications. First, it prevents the portfolio structure from being affected
by risk sharing considerations, which are interesting, but are beyond the scope of our
model. Second, VC’s expected utility depends exclusively on the expected value of
her portfolio of entrepreneurial ventures net of her effort costs, and no assumptions
regarding the joint probability of the ventures’ success are necessary.
We assume that all the functions in the model are twice continuously differentiable.
The probability of venture i’s success is assumed to be strictly increasing and weakly
concave in both entrepreneur i’s and VCs’ effort levels: piei > 0, piEi > 0, pieiei ≤ 0,
piEiEi ≤ 0. The effort levels of entrepreneur i and the effort of the VC devoted to
project i are assumed to be weakly complementary: pieiEi ≥ 0. The probability of
project i’s success is positively related to the qualities of both the entrepreneur and
the VC: piα > 0 and piβ > 0. The marginal contributions of entrepreneur’s and VC’s
efforts to the project’s success are also positively related to the respective agents’
qualities, i.e. pieiα > 0 and piEiβ > 0. To ensure the existence of an equilibrium in
effort levels, we assume that pieiei + pieiEi < 0 and piEiEi + pieiEi < 0.
10 In addition, in
order to interpret pi(ei, Ei, α, β) as a probability function, we assume that 0 ≤ p ≤ 1
for all ei, Ei, α and β.
In the first stage, the VC chooses the number of projects to finance, n, the profit
share in each venture offered to entrepreneurs, xi for project i, and makes an irre-
versible investment of I in each project. We assume that VC’s wealth is unbounded
(the supply of financing by limited partners is perfectly elastic). This assumption is
supported by the empirical evidence that wealth constraints are not binding for most
10This condition is similar to the one ensuring uniqueness and global stability of the solution to
a Cournot duopoly game: πi,i + πi,−i < 0, where πi,i is the second partial derivative of firm i’s
profit with respect to its own quantity, and πi,−i is the cross-partial derivative of firm i’s profit with
respect to its own and its rival’s quantities. (See Chapter 4 in Vives (2000)).
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VCs. For example, Cumming (2006) reports that, on average, venture capital funds
have about half of their resources invested in entrepreneurial ventures at a given point
in time.
Because a project generates zero cash flows when it fails, a linear profit sharing
rule is as good as any other sharing rule.11 The VCmakes a take-it-or-leave-it (TIOLI)
offer to each entrepreneur, specifying the share of the profits she retains in exchange
for her investment and future advice (1−xi for venture i). Each entrepreneur accepts
the TIOLI offer if his participation constraint is satisfied. We assume, for simplicity,
that if an entrepreneur rejects the offer, his reservation utility is zero. Hence, an
entrepreneur will accept any offer that leaves him with a positive profit share.12
In the second stage, the entrepreneurs and the VC choose their nonverifiable effort
levels. Effort is costly. Its cost to entrepreneur i, Ki, is increasing and convex in the
effort level: Kiei > 0 and Kieiei > 0. The cost of effort and the contribution of
a marginal unit of effort to the cost of effort are assumed to be increasing in an
entrepreneur’s “disutility of effort” parameter, γ: Kiγ > 0 and Kieiγ > 0. Similarly,
the cost of effort of the VC, L, is increasing and convex in the total amount of advice
provided to the projects: L n∑
i=1
Ei
> 0 and L n∑
i=1
Ei
n∑
i=1
Ei
> 0, for i = 1, ..., n. Moreover,
we assume that because of “coordination costs”, the total cost and the marginal cost
of VC’s effort are increasing and weakly convex in the number of firms she invests
in, holding the total effort level constant: Ln > 0, and Lnn ≥ 0. The cost of VC’s
effort, the contribution of the marginal unit of effort to the total cost of effort, and
the coordination costs are increasing in the VC’s disutility of effort parameter, δ:
11A large body of literature argues that linear profit sharing contracts are not optimal in the
venture capital setting (see, for example, Cornelli and Yosha (2003), and Schmidt (2003)), and
that convertible securities should be used instead. Kaplan and Strömberg (2003) find that in their
sample of 213 financing rounds, convertible securities are used in 206 rounds, and 170 rounds use
solely convertible preferred stock. They find, however, that the state contingencies of cash flow rights
are not very large. Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine (1995) show that the optimal sharing rule can
be obtained with a linear contract in a setting with double-sided moral hazard, but no asymmetric
information and risk neutral agents.
12An entrepreneur does not commit to exert any effort by accepting the offer. Therefore, the
worst he can do is receive zero expected value, since the expected value of a project is non-negative,
and the entrepreneur does not invest any funds in the project.
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Lδ > 0, L n∑
i=1
Eiδ
> 0 and Lnδ > 0. The VC and the entrepreneurs maximize the
expected values of their respective shares of the projects net of effort costs, UV C and
Ueni respectively, given the sharing rules, xi for project i, and the size of the VC’s
portfolio, n:
Ueni = xipi(ei, Ei, α, β)R−Ki(ei, γ) for i = 1, ..., n, (1)
UV C =
n∑
i=1
[[1− xi]pi(ei, Ei, α, β)R− I]− L(
n∑
i=1
Ei, n, δ). (2)
The game is solved by finding a sub-game perfect equilibrium. In the second stage,
n entrepreneurs and the VC maximize their expected values, net of effort costs, with
respect to their own effort levels, given the size of VC’s portfolio and the (linear) profit
sharing rules. In the first stage, the VC chooses the number of portfolio companies
and the profit shares given to the entrepreneurs, while accounting for her own and
entrepreneurs’ second-stage optimal effort levels choices.
In order to ensure interior solutions for the parties’ optimal effort levels, we assume
that the marginal benefit of VC’s and entrepreneurs’ efforts are higher than their
respective marginal effort cost, as the effort levels approach zero: xipieiR > Kiei as
ei → 0 for any xi > 0, Ei > 0, α > 0, β > 0, and γ > 0, and [1 − xi]piEiR > LEi as
Ei → 0 for any xi > 0, n > 0, ei > 0, α > 0, β > 0, and δ > 0.
3 Optimal effort levels
In this section we derive the second-stage optimal effort levels of the VC and the en-
trepreneurs, taking the portfolio structure as given. Maximizing each entrepreneur’s
expected value, Ueni in (1), with respect to his effort level, ei, and VC’s expected
value, Uvc in (2), with respect to the level of advice given to each entrepreneur, Ei,
results in a system of 2n first-order conditions that have to hold simultaneously in
equilibrium. The n F.O.C.’s of entrepreneurs are
xipieiR−Kiei = 0 for i = 1, ..., n, (3)
indicating that each entrepreneur chooses his effort so that its marginal benefit equals
its marginal cost. The n F.O.C.’s of the VC are
[1− xi]piEiR− LEi = 0 for i = 1, ..., n, (4)
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ensuring that in equilibrium the marginal cost of VC’s effort equals the marginal
increase in the expected value of venture i.
While multiple asymmetric equilibria may exist, in order to obtain tractable re-
sults, we restrict our attention to symmetric equilibria. The following lemma es-
tablishes the existence of a symmetric equilibrium in the second stage, in which all
entrepreneurs choose identical effort levels, and the VC devotes the same effort to
each project. The symmetric equilibrium in effort levels is conditional on the VC
offering identical profit shares to all entrepreneurs in the first stage. We prove, in the
next section, that there exists an equilibrium in the first stage of the game, in which
the VC gives equal profit shares to all entrepreneurs.
Lemma 1 If the profit shares given to all entrepreneurs are equal, xi = x for all
i = 1, ..., n, then there exists a symmetric equilibrium in entrepreneurs’ and VC’s
effort levels, where e∗i (x, n) = e
∗(x, n) and E∗i (x, n) = E
∗(x, n) for all i = 1, ..., n.
In this symmetric equilibrium, VC’s effort is evenly distributed across n firms in
her portfolio, and all entrepreneurs exert identical efforts. Therefore, for the sym-
metric case, the system of F.O.C.’s in (3) and (4) may be rewritten as the following
system of two equations:
xpeR−Ke = 0, (5)
[1− x]pER− LE = 0, (6)
where p denotes the probability of success of each entrepreneurial project, e is each
entrepreneur’s effort level, and E is the effort exerted by the VC on each project.
Differentiating this system of equations with respect to the number of portfolio
firms, n, while assuming fixed profit share, x, equating the resulting expressions to
zero, and solving the system of two equations leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 1 For any given x = x, VC’s equilibrium effort devoted to each project,
E∗(n, x), is strictly decreasing in the number of firms in her portfolio, n. If there are
no complementarities between entrepreneurs’ and VC’s efforts, peE = 0, then the
equilibrium effort level of each entrepreneur, e∗(n, x), is independent of n. If efforts
are complementary, peE > 0, then e
∗(n, x) is strictly decreasing in n.
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We illustrate the relations between E∗, e∗, and n, described in Proposition 1 in
Figure 1. Figure 1A describes the case of no complementarities between entrepre-
neurs’ and VC’s efforts, while Figure 1B presents the case of complementary efforts.
Increasing the number of portfolio firms stretches VC’s effort over more projects.
If, as we assumed, the total cost of effort is convex in n, then the optimal level of
VC’s advice to each firm decreases as n increases. In addition, if entrepreneurs’ and
VC’s efforts are complementary, reduced advice by the VC induces entrepreneurs to
optimally exert less effort. This latter effect, in turn, reinforces VC’s incentive to
exert less effort. Therefore, the direct and the indirect effects of a change in n on the
effort levels of the entrepreneurs and the VC are reinforcing. The indirect effect is
zero in the absence of complementarities, in which case the optimal effort of a typical
entrepreneur, e∗, is not affected by n.
We now turn to the relation between the equilibrium effort levels and the profit
share offered to the entrepreneurs, x. Differentiating the system in (5) and (6) with
respect to x, while assuming that the number of firms in the portfolio is fixed, equating
the resulting expressions to zero, and solving the system of two equations, leads to
the following result:
Proposition 2 1) If VC’s and entrepreneurs’ efforts are not complementary, peE =
0, then for any given n = n, the equilibrium effort of each entrepreneur, e∗(n, x), is
strictly increasing in the share given to entrepreneurs, x, and the equilibrium effort
of the VC devoted to each project, E∗(n, x), is strictly decreasing in x.
2) If VC’s and entrepreneurs’ efforts are complementary, peE > 0, then for any given
n = n, e∗(n, x), and E∗(n, x) do not vary monotonically with the share given to
entrepreneurs, x. For x → 1, both e∗(n, x) and E∗(n, x) are decreasing in x. For
x→ 0, both e∗(n, x) and E∗(n, x) are increasing in x.
The profit shares given to entrepreneurs, x, have a direct and, possibly, an indirect
effect on VC’s and entrepreneurs’ optimal effort levels. The direct effect of an increase
in x is the reduced (increased) incentive of the VC (entrepreneurs) to exert effort for
any given effort level of the entrepreneurs (VC). If entrepreneurs’ and VC’s efforts
are complementary, then there is also an indirect effect of increasing x. Increased
entrepreneurial effort raises the expected value of each venture given the VC’s level
of effort, increasing the VC’s marginal benefit of exerting effort. Because the two
effects have opposite implications for the equilibrium VC’s effort level, the sign of the
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relation between E∗ and x depends on their relative magnitudes. The same discussion
applies, of course, to entrepreneurs’ effort levels, which are affected by x directly and
indirectly (through the change in the optimal VC’s effort).
We illustrate the two parts of Proposition 2 in Figure 2. Figure 2A presents the
case of no complementarities, while Figures 2B and 2C describe the case in which
efforts are complementary for x → 1 and x → 0 respectively. If efforts are comple-
mentary, then when the share given to a typical entrepreneur is close to one, a further
increase in his share does not (directly) increase his optimal effort level enough to
offset the indirect negative effect of the reduced VC’s effort. Hence, for x close to
one, the indirect effect more than offsets the direct effect. This results in a negative
combined effect of increasing x on both VC’s and entrepreneurs’ effort levels. On the
other hand, when x is close to zero, the direct negative effect of increasing x on the
optimal VC’s effort level is more than offset by the indirect positive effect of increased
entrepreneur’s effort level. Hence, for x close to zero, both entrepreneurs’ and VC’s
effort levels are increasing in x.
In addition to studying the effects of changes in x and n on the optimal efforts
of the entrepreneurs and the VC, our general framework allows us to analyze the
effect of changes in the model’s parameters on the equilibrium efforts. The set of
parameters, Φ, includes the quality parameters of the VC and entrepreneurs, their
disutility of effort parameters, the value of a successful project, and the required
initial investment: Φ = {α, β, γ, δ, R, I}. The next proposition establishes these
relations.
Proposition 3 For any given n = n and x = x, the equilibrium effort level of each
entrepreneur, e∗(n, x,Φ), and the equilibrium effort devoted to each project by the VC,
E∗(n, x,Φ), are monotonically increasing in their own quality; are monotonically de-
creasing in their own disutility of effort; are monotonically increasing in the value
of a successful project; and are independent of the required investment. In addition,
if efforts are complementary, peE > 0, e
∗(n, x,Φ) and E∗(n, x,Φ) are monotonically
increasing in entrepreneurs’/VC’s counterparty’s quality and are monotonically de-
creasing in their counterparty’s disutility of effort.
This result is intuitive. VC’s and entrepreneurs’ efforts are increasing (decreasing)
in the value of a successful project and in their own quality (disutility of effort) because
of the trade-off between the marginal costs and benefits of exerting effort. If efforts
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are complementary, the same logic holds for VC’s and entrepreneurs’ counterparty’s
quality and disutility of effort. In the absence of complementarities, each party’s effort
level is independent of the counterparty’s characteristics. The equilibrium effort levels
do not depend on the cost of initial investment because in the effort choice stage this
investment is sunk.
4 Optimal portfolio size and profit sharing rule
In this section, we examine the first stage of the game, in which the size of VC’s
portfolio and the profit sharing rule are chosen. First, we solve a partial equilib-
rium model, in which the profit sharing rule is pre-determined (and identical across
projects), and the VC maximizes her net expected value with respect to the number
of projects she invests in. This allows us to derive the partial effects of the model’s
parameters on the optimal portfolio size. We perform a similar analysis for the profit
sharing rule. That is, we assume a fixed portfolio size, and study the partial effect
of the parameters on the optimal sharing rule. Then, we integrate the two partial
equilibrium models to derive the relations between the optimal portfolio size and
the model’s parameters, when both the portfolio size and the profit sharing rule are
endogenous.
For reasons of analytical tractability, in this section we make specific assumptions
regarding the functional forms of the probability of a project’s success and entre-
preneurs’ and VC’s costs of effort. In particular, we assume that the probability of
project i’s success equals
pi =
αei + βEi
pi
. (7)
The functional form of pi in (7) weakly satisfies the assumptions of the general
model. The probability of the project’s success is linearly increasing in VC’s and
entrepreneur’s effort levels. Their efforts are not complementary, in the sense that
the cross-partial derivative of pi with respect to efforts is zero. The value of pi in
(7) is chosen so that the equilibrium probability of a project’s success is lower than
one.13
13One possible value of pi is αêi+βÊi, where êi and Êi are social welfare-maximizing effort levels
(which maximize the expected value of venture i net of the costs of parties’ efforts devoted to the
venture). The proof of this statement is available upon request.
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The effort cost function of entrepreneur i, Ki, takes the following form:
Ki = γe
2
i , (8)
and the total cost of effort of a VC, L, is given by:
L = δ
[ n∑
i=1
Ei
]2
+ n2
 . (9)
The last element in (9) reflects the assumption that coordination costs are increasing
and convex in the number of portfolio firms. This functional form is parallel to that
in Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine (1995), where the effort is separated into “private”
and “public”. In our framework, δ
[
n∑
i=1
Ei
]2
is the total cost of private effort, while
δn2 is the cost of public effort. Before solving the model, we establish that there exists
an equilibrium in which the profit shares that the VC offers to the n entrepreneurs
are identical. We focus on a symmetric equilibrium in profit shares thereafter.14
Lemma 2 There exists a symmetric equilibrium in the profit shares given to the
entrepreneurs, in which x∗i (n,Φ) = x
∗(n,Φ) for all i = 1, ..., n.
The expected values of a typical entrepreneur and the VC, net of effort costs, in
(1) and (2) may be rewritten as
Ueni = xR
[
αei + βEi
p
]
− γe2i , (10)
UV C =
n∑
i=1
[
[1− x]R
[
αei + βEi
p
]]
− nI − δ
[ n∑
i=1
Ei
]2
+ n2
 , (11)
where x is a venture’s share given to each entrepreneur. Applying the F.O.C.’s in (5)
and (6) results in the following equilibrium effort levels devoted to each venture by
the VC and the entrepreneur:
e∗ =
xαR
2γp
, (12)
E∗ =
[1− x]βR
2δnp
. (13)
14To ensure that 0 ≤ x∗(n,Φ) ≤ 1, we also require the following restriction to hold: α
2
γ
− β
2
δ
≥ 0.
(The reason for this restriction becomes clear in Section 4.2.)
12
The effect of the model’s parameters on the equilibrium effort levels of entrepreneurs
and of the VC are consistent with those derived in the general framework discussed
in the previous section for the case of no complementarities. The optimal effort
levels of the VC and the entrepreneurs are independent of the characteristics of their
counterparty. Moreover, the equilibrium effort level of the entrepreneurs is unrelated
to the number of firms in VC’s portfolio, while VC’s optimal per-project effort is
decreasing in n. Finally, as shown in Section 3, VC’s effort devoted to each venture
is decreasing in x, while entrepreneurs’ optimal efforts are increasing in x.
4.1 Optimal portfolio size when the profit sharing rule is
fixed
In this subsection, we assume that the profit sharing rule, x, is fixed, and examine
the effects of x and the model’s parameters on the optimal number of firms in VC’s
portfolio, n∗(x,Φ). Focusing on a symmetric equilibrium, we can rewrite the expected
value of VC’s portfolio in (11) as:
UV C = n
[
[1− x]
R2
p2
[
xα2
2γ
+
[1− x]β2
2δn
]
− I − δ
[
[1− x]2β2R2
4δ2np2
+ n
]]
. (14)
Differentiating VC’s expected value in (14) with respect to n, and equating the re-
sulting expression to zero, gives the optimal size of VC’s portfolio:
n∗(x,Φ) =
1
4
[1− x] xR2α2
γδp2
−
1
2
I
δ
. (15)
Analyzing the expression in (15) leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 4 The optimal number of firms in VC’s portfolio, n∗(x,Φ), does not
vary monotonically with the profit share given to entrepreneurs, x. For x < 1
2
,
n∗(x,Φ) is increasing in x. For x > 1
2
, n∗(x,Φ) is decreasing in x. Moreover, holding
the profit share given to entrepreneurs, x, constant, the optimal number of firms in
VC’s portfolio, n∗(x,Φ), is increasing in the quality of entrepreneurs; is independent
of the quality of the VC; is decreasing in the disutilities of effort of entrepreneurs and
the VC; is increasing in the value of a successful project; and is decreasing in the
required investment in each project.
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The direct effect of increasing entrepreneurs’ profit shares on the value of VC’s
portfolio is negative. In addition, increasing x reduces the optimal VC’s per-project
effort level, which further reduces the expected value of each project. However, it
also increases the optimal entrepreneurs’ efforts, increasing the value of VC’s portfolio.
VC’s optimal reaction to the change in x in terms of portfolio size may take two forms.
The VC can invest in fewer projects and increase his level of advice to each venture,
thus increasing each project’s value. Alternatively, the VC can decide to invest in a
larger number of ventures, possibly increasing the total value of his portfolio. Which
of these two alternatives is optimal depends on the profit shares retained by the
entrepreneurs. For large x, the positive (indirect) effect of decreasing n on VC’s
expected profits through her increased effort level is larger in absolute magnitude
than the negative (direct) effect of the reduced number of projects (i.e., dn
∗
dx
< 0).
However, for small enough x, the reverse is true: the positive direct effect of increasing
n dominates the negative indirect effect (i.e., dn
∗
dx
> 0). This non-monotonicity plays a
crucial role in the next subsection, in which we investigate the total effects of changes
in the model’s parameters on the optimal VC’s portfolio size.
Intuitively, the portfolio size is positively related to the profitability of each ven-
ture. Thus, a higher quality of entrepreneurs, lower disutility of the parties’ efforts,
higher value of a successful project, and lower required initial investment result in a
higher value of each venture and in a larger optimal portfolio size.15
Proposition 4 is generally consistent with the results in KK. The crucial assump-
tion underlying Proposition 4, however, is that the profit sharing rule is determined
exogenously. In Subsection 4.3 we derive the relations between the optimal portfolio
size and the model’s parameters when the profit sharing rule is a choice variable. We
show that in such setting one cannot make unambiguous predictions regarding the
relations between the optimal portfolio size and the model’s parameters.
15VC’s quality does not affect the optimal portfolio size in (15). A higher VC’s quality increases
the value of each venture, given VC’s per-project effort level. This, in turn, leads the VC to fund a
larger number of projects. However, the optimal VC’s per-project effort level decreases as the number
of firms in his portfolio increases, which reduces the value of each venture. Holding everything else
constant, this would reduce the optimal number of projects to be funded. In our model, the two
effects exactly offset each other. Thus, the optimal number of firms chosen by the VC is independent
of her quality parameter. This result follows from the specific functional forms in the model. In a
more general setting, the effect of the VC’s quality on the optimal number of portfolio firms is likely
to be positive.
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4.2 Optimal profit sharing rule when the portfolio size is
fixed
In this subsection we assume that the number of firms in VC’s portfolio is fixed and
investigate the effects of the parameters on the optimal profit share given by the VC
to entrepreneurs, x∗(n,Φ). Differentiating VC’s expected value in (14) with respect
to x, and equating the resulting expression to zero, provides the following expression
for the optimal profit sharing rule, given the portfolio size:
x∗(n,Φ) =
α2
γ
n− β
2
δ
2α
2
γ
n− β
2
δ
. (16)
The next proposition establishes how x∗(n,Φ) varies with the number of portfolio
firms, n, and the set of the model’s parameters, Φ.
Proposition 5 The optimal profit share given to the entrepreneurs, x∗(n,Φ) is in-
creasing in the number of portfolio firms, n. Moreover, holding the portfolio size,
n, constant, x∗(n,Φ), is increasing in entrepreneurs’ quality parameter and in VC’s
disutility of effort parameter; is decreasing in VC’s quality parameter and in entre-
preneurs’ disutility of effort parameter; and is independent of the value of a successful
project and of the required investment.
Increasing the number of portfolio firms reduces the equilibrium per-firm effort
level of the VC, thus reducing the expected value of each project. In order to mitigate
the negative direct effect of the reduced VC’s per-project effort, the VC optimally
increases the profit shares offered to the entrepreneurs. This increases entrepreneurs’
optimal efforts, which, in turn, positively affects the projects’ expected values.
The relations between the model’s parameters and x∗(n,Φ) follow from their direct
effects on the expected value of the ventures and from the indirect effects through
the optimal efforts of the VC and the entrepreneurs. The relations in Proposition 5
reflect the relative magnitudes of the direct and the indirect effects. Because both
VC’s and entrepreneurs’ effort levels, and the expected values of the ventures are
linear in the value of a successful project, R, the latter does not affect the optimal
sharing rule. Because the parties’ equilibrium effort levels, e∗ and E∗, are independent
of the required initial investment, I, the latter does not interact with x and, thus,
does not affect the equilibrium sharing rule.
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4.3 The total effects of the parameters on the optimal port-
folio size and the profit sharing rule
The parameters of the model influence the choice variables in two ways. First, there
is a direct effect, outlined in Propositions 4 and 5. In addition, there is an indirect
effect, through changes induced into the other choice variable. Using the envelope
theorem to examine the total effect of each of the parameters on the optimal profit
sharing rule leads to the following result:
Proposition 6 When both the profit sharing rule and the portfolio size are endoge-
nous, the equilibrium profit shares given to the entrepreneurs are increasing in entre-
preneurs’ quality and in the value of a successful project; are decreasing in the quality
of the VC, in entrepreneurs’ disutility of effort, and in the required initial investment;
and are independent of VC’s disutility of effort.
The difference between the relations in Proposition 6 and those in Proposition 5
are due to the indirect effects of the parameters on the optimal entrepreneurs’ profit
shares through changes in the optimal portfolio size. In the case of the quality of
the entrepreneurs and their disutility of effort, the direct and the indirect effects are
reinforcing. In the case of VC’s quality, there is no indirect effect, since n∗(x,Φ) was
shown in Proposition 4 to be independent of VC’s quality. The optimal sharing rule
is not affected by the quality of the VC because the direct and the indirect effect of
δ exactly offset each other. Finally, the relations between x∗(n,Φ) and the value of
a successful project and the required initial investment are due solely to the indirect
effects of these parameters through the optimal portfolio size.
Proposition 6 results in testable empirical predictions regarding the reduced-form
relations between proxies for the model’s parameters and the profit shares given
to entrepreneurs. Some of the predictions are consistent with the conclusions in
Casamatta (2003), who analyzes effort exertion by a VC and entrepreneurs in a setting
in which outside financing arises endogenously. For example, Casamatta shows that
the less competent is the entrepreneur the higher the VC’s profit share. This is
consistent with the positive relation between entrepreneurs’ quality and their shares
in the ventures, demonstrated in Proposition 6.
Proposition 7 provides the relations between the optimal number of firms in VC’s
portfolio and the model’s parameters, when their indirect effects through changes in
the optimal profit sharing rule are taken into account.
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Proposition 7 When both the portfolio size and the profit sharing rule are endoge-
nous, the relations between the portfolio size and the qualities and the disutilities of
effort of the VC and the entrepreneurs are ambiguous. The optimal portfolio size is
increasing in the value of a successful project, and is decreasing in the required initial
investment.
This is one of the main results of the paper. It is impossible to make empirical
predictions regarding the reduced-form relations between most of VC’s and entre-
preneurs’ characteristics and the optimal VC’s portfolio size. The reason is that
the relation between the optimal portfolio size and the profit shares retained by the
entrepreneurs can not be signed unambiguously. Thus, it is unclear how these char-
acteristics affect the optimal portfolio size. On the other hand, the indirect effect on
n∗(Φ) through x∗(Φ) is absent in the case of changes in R and I. Thus, it is possible
to make unambiguous predictions regarding these reduced-form relations.
The main conclusion from this subsection is that the testing of the determinants
of the optimal VC’s portfolio size can not be performed in a reduced form setting. It
should be done in a framework that accounts for the simultaneous effects of various
factors on the optimal profit sharing rule and on the interrelation between the latter
and the optimal portfolio size. We discuss such framework in the next section.
5 Empirical analysis
A theory implies monotonic comparative statics, providing unambiguously signed
predictions for the reduced-form regression coefficients if and only if the theory implies
that the direct effect of a change in an exogenous variable on an endogenous variable
and the indirect effect (through another endogenous variable) are reinforcing (see, for
example, Barclay, Marx and Smith (2003)).
As demonstrated in Proposition 7, this is not the case in our model. Therefore, the
relation between the portfolio size, the profit sharing rule, and VC’s, entrepreneurs’,
and projects’ characteristics can not be tested in a reduced form. A proper testing
of our model’s predictions would involve an estimation of the following system of two
equations using an instrumental variables approach:
x∗ = ζ0 + ζ1α + ζ2β + ζ3γ + ζ4δ + ζ5R+ ζ6I + ζ7n+ ζ8Ψ+ ǫx, (17)
n∗ = η0 + η1α + η2β + η3γ + η4δ + η5R+ η6I + η7f(x) + η8Ψ+ ǫn, (18)
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where Ψ is a vector of factors that are likely to affect the VC’s optimal portfolio
structure, but were omitted from the model, such as staging, syndication, voting
rights, and control rights, among others,16 and f(x) is a non-linear function of entre-
preneurs’ profit shares, which are expected to capture the non-monotonicity of the
relation between n∗ and x.17
The predictions of our model regarding the signs of coefficients ζ̂ i and η̂i are
summarized in Table 1. Column 1 presents the signs of the predicted structural
relations between n∗, x, and the model’s parameters. For comparative purposes,
column 2 shows the reduced-form relations obtained in a setup in which x is omitted
from the n∗ equation. Column 3 shows how x∗ is expected to covary with n and the
model’s parameters, while column 4 presents the reduced-form relations between x∗
and the parameters when n is omitted from the equation.
We describe the dataset used in the empirical tests in Subsection 5.1. Subsection
5.2 presents the summary statistics for the variables of interest. Empirical tests are
presented in Subsection 5.3.
5.1 Data source
The data were obtained from a survey of and follow-up phone interviews with venture
capital and private equity funds (VC funds hereafter), in Europe and North America.
The survey and interviews were conducted in Spring and Summer of 2004. We were
able to obtain reliable, private, and confidential data from 42 limited partnership VC
funds from Canada (2 funds), Czech Republic (1 fund), Denmark (1 fund), France (3
funds), Germany (5 funds), Israel (2 funds), Italy (1 fund), the Netherlands (1 fund),
Switzerland (1 fund), the U.K. (3 funds), and the U.S. (22 funds).
These 42 funds have financed a total of 668 entrepreneurial firms by June 2004.
Two reasons motivated us to obtain data from a diverse set of countries in Europe
and North America. First, there does not exist any international evidence on VCs’
portfolio sizes. Second, by considering a diverse set of countries, we attempt to miti-
16While these factors may be determined endogenously, the theory is not rich enough to specify
a structural model in which all VC’s choice variables are endogenous. Thus, Ψ is simply included
in the right-hand side of (17) and (18).
17We achieve identification by omitting some of the elements of Ψ from (17) and (18), as discussed
below.
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gate the effects of country-specific legal and institutional structures on VCs’ portfolio
composition.18 Our data comprise details on each investment from each VC fund,
which go beyond those available from VC associations.
The funds in our data almost invariably have the typical finite horizon of 10 years,
with the option to continue for 2-3 years. The scope of the data is broadly similar
to other venture capital datasets. For example, Lerner and Schoar (2005) examine
a dataset consisting of 208 transactions by 23 private equity funds. Kaplan and
Strömberg (2003) use a dataset of a similar size.
As discussed in Lerner and Schoar (2005), it is difficult to ascertain the represen-
tativeness of the data in view of the lack of completeness of any international private
equity or venture capital dataset. However, it is important to note that the response
rate to our survey was low. Specifically, three rounds of surveys were e-mailed to over
8,000 funds, indicating a response rate of about 0.5%. Because of the diverse charac-
teristics of respondent funds and because the summary statistics discussed below are
generally in line with other empirical VC studies, we do not think that our results are
influenced by a self-selection bias. However, the low response rate precludes us from
generalizing our results to the whole population of VC and private equity funds.
5.2 Summary statistics
We group the variables into three broad categories: (1) entrepreneurs’ ownership
percentage and VCs’ portfolio sizes, (2) proxies for the model’s parameters, and (3)
control variables. Group (1) encompasses the endogenous variables in the model, and
groups (2) - (3) contain the explanatory variables. Table 2 provides the definitions of
the variables and basic summary statistics.19
The median number of entrepreneurial firms per VC fund (NUM_FIRMS) is
9.5, and the mean is 15.9. The profit share of entrepreneurs (ENT_SHARE) typ-
ically varies over the life of the investment, subject to entrepreneurs’ performance
18We are aware of only one empirical study of VC portfolio sizes (Cumming, 2004), and that
study is based on a Canadian-only sample. The Canadian VC market is dominated by government-
sponsored funds, which could distort the results of examining VCs’ portfolio structures.
19To conserve space, we do not report the correlation matrix among the variables used in the
analysis. In general, the correlations among most explanatory variables are relatively low in absolute
value, which reduces the likelihood of the results being influenced by multicollinearity.
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(see, for example Kaplan and Strömberg (2003)). In gathering the data, we therefore
asked VC fund managers to indicate the typical ownership percentage held in their
investee companies. The median entrepreneurs’ ownership percentage is 80% in our
sample, and the mean is 70%. These numbers are somewhat higher than the typ-
ical ownership percentage reported by Kaplan and Strömberg (2003), whose study
indicates that U.S. VCs typically hold about 50% equity in the investee companies.
For U.S. VCs in our sample, the average entrepreneurs’ ownership is 68%, and the
median is 80%.
We use the mean number of years of post-high school education of entrepreneurs
in a VC fund (ENT_EDU) as a proxy for entrepreneurs’ quality, α. A proxy for en-
trepreneurs’ disutility of effort, γ, is the average age of entrepreneurs (ENT_AGE).
We proxy for VC fund managers’ quality, β, by the mean number of years of the
managers’ post-high school education (MGR_EDU).20 VC’s disutility (cost) of ef-
fort, δ, is proxied by the average age of the managers (MGR_AGE). The average
required investment in a project, I, is proxied by the average capital invested in a
venture (CAP_INV ) as of June 2004. The expected return in case the project is
successful, R, is proxied by the VCs’ perception of the proportion of projects with
expected IRR above 100% (IRR_100).
Our control variables are as follows. First, VCs’ portfolio size is expected to
be positively related to the number of managers employed by the fund. VC funds
employed a median of 5 fund managers (FND_MGR).21 Second, we expect the
number of firms in a VC fund to be positively related to the total capital raised by
the fund (CAP_RAISED). Third, the number of firms is expected to be positively
related to the total investment duration from the date of first investment to June
2004 (DUR). Fourth, we expect it to be affected by the amount of government guar-
antees for failed investments (CGOV T ), both because of a potential negative effect of
government guarantees on VCs’ effort levels and because of the potentially different
maximization function of a fund.22 We expect the profit sharing rule to be affected by
20We also use an alternative proxy based on the mean number of years of managers’ work expe-
rience and obtain results similar to those reported.
21Since the number of managers employed by a VC fund can be considered an endogenous variable,
we repeat the analysis while excluding this variable from the regressions. Omitting the number of
managers does not affect the qualitative results.
22See, for example, Keuschnigg (2004), Keuschnigg and Nielsen (2003), and Lerner (1999). None
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whether a fund is in the early stage (EARLY ). About 22% of firms in our sample are
in the early stage. We also expect entrepreneurs’ profit shares to be negatively related
to the number of financing rounds (FINANCE). The VC fund managers’ assessment
of the average risk of their entrepreneurial ventures (AV G_RISK), measured on a
scale of 1 to 10, is also expected to affect profit sharing. In addition, we expect the
proportion of firms in which a VC is the lead investor (PERCENT_LEAD) to be
positively (negatively) associated with VC’s (entrepreneurs’) profit shares. Finally,
since our data covers from different countries, we control for the country’s institu-
tional environment using a “legality index” (LEGALITY ). The legality index, based
on Berkowitz, Pistor, and Richard (2003), reflects the following factors: civil versus
common law systems, efficiency of judicial system, rule of law, corruption, risk of
expropriation, risk of contract repudiation, and shareholder rights.23
5.3 Empirical tests
Our model suggests that the relation between the portfolio size and various VCs’,
entrepreneurs’, and projects’ characteristics should be examined while accounting for
the endogeneity of the profit sharing rule. Thus, we estimate regressions of VCs’
portfolio sizes while instrumenting for entrepreneurs’ profit shares by their predicted
values from first-stage regressions, and estimate regressions of entrepreneurs’ profit
shares, instrumenting for VCs’ portfolio sizes by their predicted values from first-stage
regressions.24 Table 3 presents the results of the second-stage regressions.
The model predicts a non-monotonic relation between entrepreneurs’ profit shares,
x, and the optimal number of portfolio firms, n∗. n∗ is expected to be increasing in
x when x is low, while it is expected to be decreasing in x when it is high. We rely
on two alternative specifications to model this non-monotonicity.
of the funds in our sample are “pure” government funds with 100% government support; however,
11 funds did receive some capital from government bodies, and 2 of the funds received more than
50% of their capital from government sources.
23We also considered GNP per capita and country dummy variables as alternative controls in our
multivariate tests. However, GNP per capita is highly correlated with LEGALITY (the correlation
coefficient is 0.85), and including country dummy variables does not affect any of the results.
24The two first-stage regressions include the variables that are expected to affect portfolio size and
profit sharing, discussed above. The results of the first-stage regressions are available upon request.
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In column 1 of Table 3, we model the non-monotonicity of the relation between n∗
and x by regressing the number of firms in a VC fund (NUM_FIRMS) on the pre-
dicted first-stage entrepreneurs’ ownership percentage (INST_ENT_SHARE) and
on the squared predicted entrepreneurs’ ownership percentage (INST_ENT_SHARE2).
The coefficient on entrepreneurs’ ownership percentage is positive and significant. The
coefficient on the squared ownership percentage is negative and marginally significant,
indicating that n is increasing in x when it is low, while it is decreasing in x when x
becomes high.
The other predictions of the model are partially supported by the data. Consistent
with the model, the number of years of entrepreneurs’ education, proxying for their
quality, is positively and marginally significantly related to the number of portfolio
firms. Managers’ quality, as proxied by the number of years of their education is
significantly positively related to the portfolio size. Although the model predicts
no relation between these two variables, this is likely to be an artifact of the specific
functional forms in the model. Consistent with the model, the coefficient on managers’
average age, proxying for their disutility of effort, is negative and significant at the
10% level. The average capital investment in a venture is negatively and significantly
related to n∗.
The coefficients on control variables are mostly insignificant. This is not caused by
multicollinearity, since the (unreported) correlations among the independent variables
are small and, in most cases, insignificant. However, some of the variables exhibit
very small variation. The legality index is a good example: the vast majority of the
observations come from countries with developed legal systems, leading to almost no
variation in LEGALITY . The exception is the amount of capital raised. Consistent
with managers being pressured to invest funds that have been raised, n∗ is positively
associated with CAP_RAISED.
In column 2, we model the non-monotonicity of the relation between n∗ and x by
constructing a variable equalling the absolute value of the deviation of the predicted
first-stage value of x from a threshold, below which the effect of increasing x on n∗
is expected to be positive, and above which this effect is expected to be negative.
We use 80% as the threshold value in Panel 2 because the median entrepreneur’s
profit share in our sample is 80%.25 Consistent with the model, the coefficient on
25Various thresholds, ranging from 50% to 80%, provide results that are qualitatively similar to
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the absolute deviation from the threshold is negative and significant, indicating that
when entrepreneurs’ ownership percentage is low, increasing it (reducing the absolute
deviation from a threshold) would increase the number of portfolio firms, while when
x is large, increasing it (increasing the deviation from a threshold) would reduce n∗.
Increasing the deviation of entrepreneurs’ ownership percentage from the threshold
by one percentage point reduces the number of portfolio firms by about 0.6 firms. The
associations between n∗ and the other variables are broadly consistent with those in
column 1.
Column 3 presents the results of the second-stage regressions of entrepreneurs’
profit shares on the predicted first-stage portfolio size. First, and most importantly,
the entrepreneurs’ ownership percentage is positively and marginally significantly
associated with the instrument for n (INST_NUM_FIRMS). In addition, con-
sistent with the model, managers quality, as proxied by years of their education is
negatively related to x∗. The relations between entrepreneurs’ shares in their ven-
tures and proxies for the other parameters of the model and the control variables are
generally insignificant.
Overall, the data provide some support for our model. The strongest support
is provided for the non-monotonic relation between VCs’ portfolio sizes and entre-
preneurs’ ownership shares. The weakness of some of the other results is possibly
attributable to the scope of the available data and to our ability to simultaneously
control for numerous factors with a limited number of observations. It is important
to emphasize that because of the small sample size we view our empirical results as
preliminary and illustrative as to how to match the model with the data.
6 Conclusions
This paper develops a theoretical model in which a venture capitalist (VC) simulta-
neously chooses the profit sharing rule between herself and entrepreneurs and the size
of her portfolio of entrepreneurial ventures. Profit sharing and portfolio size are both
central to the venture capital finance problem, as VCs write contracts to mitigate
double-sided moral hazard problem and undertake a limited number of investments
to add value to entrepreneurial ventures they invest in. Prior theoretical models of
those reported.
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venture capital finance have either considered portfolio size or contracts in isolation.
A joint analysis of contracts and portfolio size illustrates an important non-monotonic
relationship between the optimal VC’s portfolio size and the profit shares given to
entrepreneurs.
In our model, a VC maximizes her expected portfolio value net of her effort costs,
with respect to the number of projects she invests in and to the share of the projects’
expected values that she gives to entrepreneurs. The portfolio structure affects the
unobservable effort levels of the entrepreneurs and the VC, thus influencing the value
of VC’s portfolio.
Our analysis generates predictions for the partial effects of various characteristics
of VCs, entrepreneurs and projects on VC’s portfolio size and profit sharing when both
are chosen endogenously. The optimal VC’s portfolio size is predicted to be positively
related to the quality of entrepreneurs and to the value of a successful project, and to
be negatively related to the disutilities that the VC and the entrepreneurs have from
exerting effort, and to the required initial investment in the projects. The relation
between the optimal portfolio size and the profit sharing rule is predicted to be non-
monotonic: the optimal number of firms is first increasing and then is decreasing in
the share of the profits retained by entrepreneurs
Furthermore, our analysis shows that when both the VC’s portfolio size and the
profit share given to entrepreneurs are determined endogenously, one can not make
unambiguous predictions regarding the reduced-form relations between the optimal
portfolio size and the model’s parameters. Therefore, we conclude that the empirical
analysis of VCs’ portfolio size must be performed while accounting for the endogeneity
of the profit sharing rule.
We test the predictions of the model using data collected through a survey of
venture capital and private equity funds in Europe and North America. Our sample
includes 42 VC funds. Using instrumental variables we find that a VC’s portfolio
size varies non-monotonically with the profit share retained by entrepreneurs. An-
other finding that is consistent with the model is that entrepreneurs’ profit shares
are increasing in the portfolio size. In addition, the relations among VCs’ portfolio
sizes and entrepreneurs’ profit shares and proxies for various model’s parameters are
generally consistent with the model.
Given the small size of our sample of VC funds, we view the empirical results
reported here as preliminary and believe that further research is warranted. In par-
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ticular, although the model clearly has limitations, we think that the most interesting
and potentially rewarding area of research is a further empirical examination of the
determinants of venture capitalists’ portfolio structures using larger and more rep-
resentative datasets of VC funds. Such tests will greatly improve our understanding
of the choices venture capitalists make.
25
A Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
Without loss of generality, we restrict our attention to two entrepreneurs, i and
j. xi = xj = x by assumption. Assume first that VC chooses to devote identical
efforts to both ventures: Ei = Ej = E. Then, the F.O.C.’s for entrepreneurs i’s and
j’s effort level choices in (3) may be rewritten as
xpiei (ei, E, α, β)R −Kiei (ei, δ) = 0, (A.1)
xpjej (ej, E, α, β)R −Kjej (ej , δ) = 0. (A.2)
Assume ei = e
∗ solves (A.1). Then, since piei (e
∗, E, α, β) = pjej (e
∗, E, α, β) and
Kiei (e
∗, δ) = Kjej (e
∗, δ), ej = e
∗ also solves (A.2). Therefore, e∗i (E) = e
∗
j(E), implying
that if the VC devotes the same effort level to each project, then the optimal effort
levels of entrepreneurs are identical.
Now, we relax the assumption of VC devoting the same effort to each venture, and
assume instead that the two entrepreneurs choose identical effort levels: ei = ej = e.
Then, the two F.O.C.’s of VC in (4) may be rewritten as
[1− x] piEi (e, Ei, α, β)R− LiEi (Ei, Ej, n, δ) = 0, (A.3)
[1− x] piEj (e, Ej, α, β)R− LiEj (Ei, Ej , n, δ) = 0. (A.4)
Assume that Ei = E
∗ solves (A.3). Then, similar to the arguments above, Ej = E
∗
also solves (A.4). Thus, E∗i (e) = E
∗
j (e), implying that if the two entrepreneurs choose
identical effort levels, then the VC chooses to devote identical efforts to the two
ventures. Given the symmetric equilibrium above, the F.O.C.’s of the entrepreneurs
and the VC in (3) and (4) respectively may be rewritten as
xpe(e, E, α, β)R −Ke(e, δ) = 0, (A.5)
and
[1− x] pE(e,E, α, β)R− LE(E, n, δ) = 0. (A.6)
Totally differentiating the F.O.C. in (A.5) with respect to E results in
de∗(E)
dE
= −
xpieER
xpieeR−Kiee
.
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Given the assumptions on the derivatives, this implies that de
∗(E)
dE
≥ 0. Similarly,
differentiating the F.O.C. in (A.6) with respect to e results in dE
∗(e)
de
≥ 0. In addition,
it follows from the assumptions that e∗(E) > 0 when E → 0. Also, piee + pieE < 0
implies de
∗(E)
dE
< 1. Similarly, E∗(e) > 0 when e → 0, and dE
∗(e)
de
< 1. Therefore,
the reaction functions e∗(E) and E∗(e) intersect at least once, and there exists a
symmetric equilibrium in effort levels, in which the two equations
e∗ = argmax
e
Uen(e, E
∗, α, β, δ),
E∗ = argmax
E
Uvc(e
∗, E, α, β, γ)
hold simultaneously. 
Proof of Proposition 1
Totally differentiating the F.O.C.’s in (5) and (6) with respect to n, while holding
x constant, gives the following system of two equations:
peexR
de∗(E)
dn
+ peExR
dE∗(e)
dn
−Kee
de∗(E)
dn
= 0, (A.7)
pEE[1− x]R
dE∗(e)
dn
+ peE[1− x]R
de∗(E)
dn
− LEn − LEE
dE∗(e)
dn
= 0. (A.8)
Solving the system of (A.7) and (A.8), while substituting in the F.O.C.’s in (5) and
(6) results in
dE∗
dn
= −
[Kee − peexR]LEn
Γ
,
de∗
dn
= −
peExRLEn
Γ
,
where
Γ = [LEE − pEE[1− x]R][Kee − peexR]− [1− x]xR
2p2eE. (A.9)
Given the assumptions on derivatives, it is straightforward to show that Γ > 0 and
that dE
∗
dn
< 0. If there are no complementarities (peE = 0), then
de∗
dn
= 0, while, if
peE > 0, then
de∗
dn
< 0. 
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Proof of Proposition 2
Totally differentiating the F.O.C.’s in (5) and (6) with respect to x, while holding
n constant, provides the following system of equations:
peR+ peexR
de∗(E)
dx
+ peExR
dE∗(e)
dx
−Kee
de∗(E)
dx
= 0, (A.10)
−pER+ pEE[1− x]R
dE∗(e)
dx
+ peE[1− x]R
de∗(E)
dx
− LEE
dE∗(e)
dx
= 0. (A.11)
Solving the system in (A.10) and (A.11), while substituting in the F.O.C.’s in (5)
and (6) gives
dE∗
dx
=
∆
Γ
,
de∗
dx
=
Θ
Γ
,
where Γ is defined in (A.9) and was shown to be positive, and
∆ = R[KepeE
[1− x]
x
− pE[Kee − peexR]],
Θ = −R[LEpeE
x
[1− x]
− pe[LEE − pEE[1− x]R]].
If there is no complementarities between the effort of the entrepreneur and that of
the VC (peE = 0), then, given the assumptions on derivatives, it is easy to show that
Θ is strictly positive, while ∆ is strictly negative, which proves the first part of this
proposition.
If there are complementarities (peE > 0), using the assumptions on derivatives, it
is straightforward to show that limx→0∆ = ∞, limx→0Θ = Rpe[LEE − pEER] > 0,
limx→1∆ = −RpE[Kee − peeR] < 0, limx→1Θ = −∞. It follows that limx→0
dE∗
dx
> 0,
limx→1
dE∗
dx
< 0, limx→0
de∗
dx
> 0, limx→1
de∗
dx
< 0, which proves the second part of the
proposition. 
Proof of Proposition 3
Totally differentiating the F.O.C.’s in (5) and (6) with respect to α, while holding
n and x constant, yields the following system of equations:
peexR
de∗(E)
dα
+ peExR
dE∗(e)
dα
+ peαxR−Kee
de∗(E)
dα
= 0, (A.12)
pEE[1− x]R
dE∗(e)
dα
+ peE[1− x]R
de∗(E)
dα
+ pEα[1− x]R− LEE
dE∗(e)
dα
= 0. (A.13)
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Solving the system in (A.12) and (A.13), while substituting in the F.O.C.’s in (5)
and (6) gives
dE∗
dα
=
[1− x]R
Γ
[pEα[Kee − peexR] + peαpeExR],
de∗
dα
=
xR
Γ
[peα[LEE − pEE[1− x]R] + pEαpeE[1− x]R],
where Γ is defined in (A.9) and was shown to be positive. Using the assumptions
on derivatives, it is straightforward to show that, for any α, de
∗
dα
> 0. In addition, if
efforts are complementary, peE > 0, then
dE∗
dα
> 0, otherwise dE
∗
dα
= 0.
By following the same approach, it can be easily shown that the derivatives of E∗
and e∗ with respect to β, γ, δ, and R are equal to the following expressions:
dE∗
dβ
=
(1− x)R
Γ
[pEβ[Kee − peexR] + peβpeExR],
de∗
dβ
=
xR
Γ
[peβ[LEE − pEE[1− x]R] + pEβpeE[1− x]R],
dE∗
dγ
= −
peE[1− x]R
Γ
Keγ,
de∗
dγ
= −
[LEE − pEE[1− x]R]
Γ
Keγ ,
dE∗
dδ
= −
[Kee − peexR]
Γ
LEδ
de∗
dδ
= −
peExR
Γ
LEδ,
dE∗
dR
=
[1− x]
Γ
[pE[Kee − peexR] + pepeExR],
de∗
dR
=
x
Γ
[pe[LEE − pEE[1− x]R] + pEpeE[1− x]R].
Using the assumptions on derivatives, it is easily shown that dE
∗
dβ
> 0, de
∗
dβ
> 0 if
peE > 0 and
de∗
dβ
= 0 if peE = 0,
dE∗
dγ
< 0 if peE > 0 and
dE∗
dγ
= 0 if peE = 0,
de∗
dγ
< 0,
dE∗
dδ
< 0, de
∗
dδ
< 0 if peE > 0 and
de∗
dδ
= 0 if peE = 0,
dE∗
dR
> 0, de
∗
dR
> 0. In addition,
dE∗
dI
= 0, de
∗
dI
= 0. This concludes the proof. 
Proof of Lemma 2
Without loss of generality, we focus on two entrepreneurs, i and j. It was shown
in Lemma 1 that xi = xj = x is consistent with e
∗
i (x) = e
∗
j(x) and E
∗
i (x) = E
∗
j (x).
We now show that, given the best responses, e∗(E∗, x) and E∗(e∗, x), obtained in the
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second stage of the game, xi = xj = x
∗ is indeed a symmetric equilibrium. Given
the best responses e∗i and e
∗
j , maximizing UV C with respect to xi and xj, yields the
following 2 F.O.C.’s:
piE [1− xi]R
dE∗i (ei)
dxi
+ piei [1− xi]R
de∗i (Ei)
dxi
− LEi − piR = 0, (A.14)
pjE [1− xj ]R
dE∗j (ej)
dxj
+ pjej [1− xj]R
de∗j(Ej)
dxj
− LEj − pjR = 0. (A.15)
Because of the symmetry in effort levels, if x∗ solves (A.14), then it must solve (A.15)
as well, which proves the claim. 
Proof of Proposition 4
Differentiating n∗(x,Φ) in (15) with respect to x results in
∂n∗(x,Φ)
∂x
=
α2R2 [1− 2x]
4γδp2
.
For x < 1
2
, ∂n
∗(x,Φ)
∂x
> 0, and for x > 1
2
, ∂n
∗(x,Φ)
∂x
< 0.
Moreover, partially differentiating n∗(x,Φ) in (15) with respect to α, β, γ, δ, R,
and I respectively gives
∂n∗(x,Φ)
∂α
=
αR2x [1− x]
2γδp2
> 0,
∂n∗(x,Φ)
∂β
= 0,
∂n∗(x,Φ)
∂γ
= −
α2R2x [1− x]
4γ2δp2
< 0,
∂n∗(x,Φ)
∂δ
= −
1
δ
[
1
4
[1− x] xR2α2
γδp2
−
1
2
I
δ
]
= −
1
δ
n∗(x,Φ) < 0,
∂n∗(x,Φ)
∂R
=
α2Rx [1− x]
2γδp2
> 0,
∂n∗(x,Φ)
∂I
= −
1
2δ
< 0.
This concludes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 5
Partially differentiating the expression for x∗(n,Φ) in (16) with respect to n results
in
∂x∗(n,Φ)
∂n
=
α2β2γδ[
2α2δn− β2γ
]2 > 0.
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Furthermore, partially differentiating x∗(n,Φ) in (16) with respect to α, β, γ, and δ
gives
∂x∗(n,Φ)
∂α
=
2αβ2γδn[
2α2δn− β2γ
]2 > 0,
∂x∗(n,Φ)
∂β
= −
2α2βγδn[
2α2δn− β2γ
]2 < 0,
∂x∗(n,Φ)
∂γ
= −
α2β2δn[
2α2δn− β2γ
]2 < 0,
∂x∗(n,Φ)
∂δ
=
α2β2γn[
2α2δn− β2γ
]2 > 0.
Because x∗(n,Φ) does not depend on R and I, its derivative with respect to these
variables is equal to zero. 
Proof of Proposition 6
Using the envelope theorem, we can write
dx∗(Φ)
dα
=
∂x∗(n,Φ)
∂α
+
∂x∗(n,Φ)
∂n
∂n∗(x,Φ)
∂α
, (A.16)
and similarly for the case of other parameters. Using the relations derived in Propo-
sitions 4 and 5, it is straightforward to show that dx
∗(Φ)
dα
> 0, dx
∗(Φ)
dβ
< 0, dx
∗(Φ)
dγ
< 0,
dx∗(Φ)
dR
> 0, dx
∗(Φ)
dI
< 0. In addition, using an expression analogous to (A.16), we can
write that at n∗
dx∗(Φ)
dδ
=
α2β2γn∗[
2α2δn∗ − β2γ
]2 + α2β2γδ[
2α2δn∗ − β2γ
]2 [−1δn∗
]
= 0.
This concludes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 7
Using the envelope theorem and the results in Propositions 4 and 5, we can write
dn∗(Φ)
dα
=
αR2x [1− x]
2γδp2
+
α2R2 [1− 2x]
4γδp2
2αβ2γδn[
2α2δn− β2γ
]2 . (A.17)
For x → 0, (A.17) is positive. For x → 1, (A.17) is negative. Similarly, for x →
0, dn
∗(Φ)
dβ
< 0, dn
∗(Φ)
dγ
< 0, dn
∗(Φ)
dδ
> 0, while for x → 1, dn
∗(Φ)
dβ
> 0, dn
∗(Φ)
dγ
> 0,
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dn∗(Φ)
dδ
< 0. Thus, the relations between n∗(Φ) and α, β, γ, and δ can not be signed
unambiguously. For the cases of R and I, we use Proposition 4 to write
dn∗(Φ)
dR
=
∂n∗(x,Φ)
∂R
> 0,
dn∗(Φ)
dI
=
∂n∗(x,Φ)
∂I
< 0.
This concludes the proof. 
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Table 1 — Empirical predictions for the system of equations
Columns 1 and 3 summarize the empirical predictions for the signs of the struc-
tural relations between the model’s parameters and the equilibrium VC’s portfolio
size (n∗) and the equilibrium entrepreneurs’ profit shares (x∗) respectively. For com-
parative purposes, columns 2 and 4 summarize the reduced-form relations between
the model’s parameters and n∗ and x∗ respectively. α and β are the quality para-
meters of entrepreneurs and the VC respectively. γ and δ are the disutility of effort
parameters of entrepreneurs and the VC respectively. R is the value of a successful
project, and I is the initial investment required in each project. “+” indicates a pos-
itive relation, “—” indicates a negative relation, “0” means that the model predicts
no relation between an exogenous and an endogenous variable, and “?” means that
the sign of the predicted relation is ambiguous.
Structural 
relation
Reduced-form 
relation
Structural 
relation
Reduced-form 
relation
α + ? + +
β 0 ? - -
γ - ? - -
δ - ? + 0
R + + 0 +
I - - 0 -
x + for small x
- for large x
n +
n* x*
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Table 2 — Summary statistics
This table presents the summary statistics for the variables used in the empirical
tests. NUM_FIRMS is the number of firms in a VC fund. ENT_SHARE is the
typical entrepreneur’s ownership percentage, ENT_EDU is the mean number of years
of entrepreneurs’ post-high school education, ENT_AGE is the mean entrepreneurs’
age, MGR_EDU is the mean number of years of VC fund managers’ education,
MGR_AGE is the mean VC fund managers’ age, CAP_INV is the mean investment
in each venture (in $MM), IRR_100 is the percentage of projects that are expected by
a VC to generate IRR above 100%. FND_MGR is the number of VC fund managers,
CAP_RAISED is the total funds raised by a fund (in $MM), DUR is the duration
of a fund, CGOVT is the percentage of government guarantees for failed ventures,
EARLY is the percentage of firms in the early stage, FINANCE is the number of
financing rounds, AVG_RISK is a subjective VC’s assessment of the risk of a typical
venture in his portfolio, PERCENT_LEAD is the percentage of firms in which a VC
is a lead investor, and LEGALITY is an index of a country’s legal conditions, based
on Berkowitz, Pistor and Richard (2003).
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Variable Model's parameter Mean Median Min Max Std Dev
Portfolio size and enterpreneurs' ownership percentage
NUM_FIRMS n 15.90 9.5 1 85 16.89
ENT_SHARE x 70.26 80 0 97.5 24.02
Proxies for the model's parameters
ENT_EDU α 9.74 8.75 2.5 23 4.44
ENT_AGE γ 44.08 45 33 50 3.92
MGR_EDU β 7.02 6 4 12 2.04
MGR_AGE δ 42.45 43 33 55 4.9
CAP_INV I 11.79 4.10 0.22 103.80 20.35
IRR_100 R 12.08 12 0 38.10 10.26
Control variables
FND_MGR 6.64 5 1 17 4.96
CAP_RAISED 264.90 101.50 11 3100 496.60
DUR 5.08 3.46 1 33.94 5.93
CGOVT 5.32 0 0 70 14.78
EARLY 22.26% 20.00% 0.00% 100.00% 26.28%
FINANCE 9.36 12 4 20 3.88
AVG_RISK 5.82 6 2 10 1.76
PERCENT_LEAD 58.36% 58.00% 0.00% 100.00% 28.43%
LEGALITY 20.31 20.85 14 21.91 1.50
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Table 3 — Regressions of portfolio sizes and profit shares
Columns 1 and 2 present regressions of the number of portfolio firms, NUM_FIRMS,
on non-linear functions of predicted first-stage values of entrepreneurs’ ownership
percentages, proxies for the model’s parameters, and control variables, discussed
in Table 2. In column 1 the regressions include predicted first-stage values of en-
trepreneurs’ ownership percentages, INST_ENT_SHARE, and squared predicted
values of ownership percentages, INST_ENT_SHARE2. In column 2 the regres-
sions include the absolute deviations of entrepreneurs’ ownership percentage from
80% (|INST_ENT_SHARE-80%|). Column 3 presents a regression of entrepreneurs’
ownership percentage, ENT_SHARE, on the predicted first-stage number of port-
folio firms, INST_NUM_FIRMS, proxies for the model’s parameters, and control
variables, discussed in Table 2. T-statistics are presented in parentheses.
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Model's parameter NUM_FIRMS NUM_FIRMS ENT_SHARE
Intercept -75.245 -28.349 187.430
(-1.28) (-0.87) (2.54)
INST_NUM_FIRMS n 0.582
(1.78)
INST_ENT_SHARE x 2.042
(2.06)
INST_ENT_SHARE 2 x 2 -0.016
(-1.61)
|INST_ENT_SHARE-80%| |x-80%| -0.612
(-2.15)
ENT_EDU α 0.304 0.315 0.345
(1.92) (1.94) (0.66)
ENT_AGE γ -0.471 -0.453 -1.266
(-0.84) (-0.82) (-1.34)
MGR_EDU β 0.288 0.301 -0.201
(2.32) (2.33) (-2.12)
MGR_AGE δ -0.650 -0.632 1.671
(-1.77) (-1.72) (1.59)
CAP_INV I -0.558 -0.571 0.862
(-2.95) (-3.01) (1.12)
IRR_100 R 0.162 0.169 0.152
(0.82) (0.83) (0.14)
FND_MGR -0.201 -0.177
(-0.22) (-0.20)
CAP_RAISED 0.020 0.019
(2.55) (2.45)
DUR 0.652 0.666
(1.57) (1.60)
CGOVT 0.014 0.007
(0.34) (0.19)
EARLY 0.049
(0.61)
FINANCE -0.612
(-0.88)
AVG_RISK 3.214
(1.24)
PERCENT_LEAD -23.613
(-1.73)
LEGALITY 0.970 0.894 -2.691
(0.65) (0.59) (-1.07)
Adjusted R 2 0.528 0.519 0.396
Dependent variable
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Figure 1 — The effects of a change in n on the best response functions
and the resulting equilibrium effort levels
This figure presents the best response functions of the VC (entrepreneur) before
an increase in n, E∗0(e) (e
∗
0(E)), and after the increase in n, E
∗
1(e) (e
∗
1(E)). E
∗
0 (e
∗
0)
and E∗1 (e
∗
1) are the resulting VC’s (entrepreneur’s) equilibrium efforts before and
after the change in n. Figure 1A describes the case of no complementarities, while
Figure 1B depicts the case of complementary efforts. The best responses for the case
of complementary efforts are depicted as linear functions for illustrative purposes
only.
Figure 1A — No complementarities
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Figure 1B — Complementary efforts
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Figure 2 — The effects of a change in x on the best response functions
and the resulting equilibrium effort levels
This figure presents the best response functions of the VC (entrepreneur) before
an increase in x, E∗0(e) (e
∗
1(E)), and after the increase in x, E
∗
1(e) (e
∗
0(E)). E
∗
0 (e
∗
0)
and E∗1 (e
∗
1) are the resulting VC’s (entrepreneur’s) equilibrium efforts before and
after the change in x. Figure 2A depicts the case of no complementarities. Figure 2B
presents the case of complementary efforts when x→ 1, while Figure 2C demonstrates
the case of complementary efforts when x → 0. The best responses for the case of
complementary efforts are depicted as linear functions for illustrative purposes only.
Figure 2A — No complementarities
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Figure 2B — Complementary efforts, x→ 1 Figure 2C — Complementary efforts, x→ 0
 
e*1(E) 
e*0(E) 
E 
 
 
   
    E*0(e) 
          E*1(e) 
e*0 
e*1 
       e 
E*0 E*1 
 
 
E*1(e) 
e*0 
e*1 
 e 
 
E*0(e) 
E*0 E*1 
e*1(E) 
e*0(E) 
E 
42
